Asia

... settling long-standing border issues, Moscow and Beijing agreed to hold joint military exercises in 2005. ...first ... since 1958. .... a growing arms trade . China is Russia's largest buyer of military equipment. In 2004, China ... signed deals worth more than $2 billion for Russian arms.

...In the past five years, non-military trade between Russia and China has increased at an average annual rate of nearly 20%. Moscow and Beijing have targeted non-military trade to reach $60 billion by 2010, from $20 billion in 2004. One of the key components of commercial trade is Russian energy exports to China.

... courting Chinese investment in the development and renovation of Russia's electricity system.

... rather than running into China, the new mega pipeline would terminate in Russia's Pacific port of Nakhodka. Japan lobbied Moscow hard for this configuration, offering to finance the entire construction project, the cost of which is estimated to exceed $10 billion.

... Though the pipeline does not terminate in China, it does pass within 40 miles of Russia's border with China. ... why should either Moscow or Beijing finance an eastern oil pipeline when Tokyo is bending over backwards to provide such financing?

... China's involvement in the renationalization of Yukos represents the most significant foreign participation in Russia's highly guarded oil sector.

... China ... signed a 25-year deal to import 110 million tons of LNG from Iran. This was followed by a much larger deal ... worth about $100 billion, allows China to import a further 250 million tons of LNG ... over a 25-year period.

... Total Chinese investment targeted toward Iran's energy sector could exceed a further $100 billion over 25 years.

... China became Iran's top oil export market.

... Beijing, as well as Moscow, has supplied Tehran with advanced missiles and missile technology since the mid-1980s. ... assisted in the development of Iran's long-range ballistic missiles ...

... Along with energy trade, investment and economic development, the China-Iran-Russia alliance has cultivated compatible foreign policies. China, Iran and Russia have identical foreign policy positions regarding Taiwan and Chechnya. China and Iran fully support the Putin government's war against the Chechen separatists. ... Russia and Iran support Beijing's one-China policy. ... China's and Russia's support for Iran's much-maligned nuclear energy program. (Putin) ... that Russia would not support UNSC resolutions that condemn Iran's nuclear energy program or apply economic sanctions against Iran. ... (China)... announced that China would not support UN Security Council action against Iran's nuclear energy program.

... the primary impetus behind the China-Iran-Russia axis - to counter US unilateralism and global hegemonic intentions. For Beijing and Moscow, this means minimizing US influence in Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

... China's former foreign minister Qian Qichen - arguably China's most distinguished diplomat ... "The United States has tightened its control of the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia." He noted that this control "testifies that Washington's anti-terror campaign has already gone beyond the scope of self defense". '

...Musharraf's growing international standing is at odds with his faltering position at home.

... the twin pressures of Islamic fundamentalists whom he refuses to resist and political opponents whom he harasses and jails.

... the ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League, is riven by factionalism, and Parliament is often forced to suspend business because it lacks a quorum.

... in the provinces. In Baluchistan, separatists are demanding greater autonomy and control over their natural resources. ... country's largest gas fields have been besieged by the separatists.

... In North-West Frontier Province, a neo-Taliban resistance against the army continues with the return of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban who have been recently trained in Iraq. In the southern province of Sind there is growing alienation because of interethnic strife, increased criminality and corruption and tensions between the majority Sindhis and the central government.

The only answer to the domestic problems now tearing the country apart is more democracy - in particular a free and fair election in which the political elements that have been disenfranchised since 1999 get a political stake ... The next few months will be crunch time for the army, the Americans, the mullahs and the political parties. ... the present political situation under Musharraf is unsustainable.

... took notice of events in Pakistan, because with 160 million people, nuclear weapons and a myriad of Islamic extremist groups still operating openly, Pakistan remains critical to regional and global stability. '

... have several vital common interests, notably in the war against terrorism and the desire for strategic stability in the Pacific and South Asia.

... Sino-American ties are slowly fraying while other issues take up the attention of senior American officials. Beyond the never-ending Taiwan issue and Washington's concern over China's growing military muscle ... substantially different attitudes toward the rights of people to express themselves freely and, second, the massive trade imbalance.

... that every major foreign policy issue between the two countries is also a domestic matter...

...The bilateral agenda... : Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, religious freedom, press freedom, the Falun Gong, slave labor, North Korea, Iran, trade, the exchange rate, intellectual property rights, access to Chinese markets, export of sensitive technology and the arms embargo.

In Washington, where different parts of the executive branch dominate on each issue and Congress plays a major role, it can be difficult to stick to a coherent overall policy. China, on the other hand, with its highly secretive, tightly disciplined and undemocratic system, can establish long-term policy goals and then work slowly toward them: The Chinese, are, as they like to remind visitors, a patient people.

... extraordinary economic results ... In foreign policy, however, ... China became defensive, even passive, on the world stage.

But ... begun to match their economic power with a more assertive foreign policy. Taken individually, Chinese actions may look like a series of unrelated events. But they are part of a long-term strategy. Some recent examples:

· Premier Wen Jiabao's self-proclaimed "historic visit" to India ... announced a "strategic partnership" -- vague words, of course, that could mean almost anything, but quite different from those that have, over the past 50 years, characterized this tense rivalry (which included one war).

· ... meetings ... with two top Taiwanese political leaders ...

· The anti-Japanese riots .... the acquiescence of the government. ... a crude signal that no matter what China's official position is, it does not really want Japan to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

· The highly unusual public criticism ... of American policy toward North Korea...

· China's intent -- for the first time s... -- to play a central role in the choice of the next U.N. secretary general, who is ... to be from Asia. ... cannot be Chinese (no permanent member ... have one of its own in that post)...

· buying oil fields in such remote areas as Sudan and Angola, part of a long-term strategy to address its rapidly growing energy needs. ... reluctant attitude toward strong U.N. action in the Darfur...

China's gradual emergence as a political player on the world stage comes when ... Washington is not paying the region sufficient attention. (... sharp contrast to India, where relations ... are at their historical best .) If we lose interest and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region just as it grows in economic importance, the imbalance will surely return later to haunt a new generation ...

Alas, the U.S. is mostly to blame .... the demagoguery of some Democrats in Congress.

... plenty of legitimate reasons to be angry with China's leaders, but its trade success and exchange rate policy are not among them. The country that is distorting global capital flows and destabilizing the world economy is not China but the U.S. American fiscal recklessness .... international problem ... a protectionist assault on the global trade system.

In fact, China's pegged exchange rate has brought stability to Asia, and the Chinese boom has tugged Japan out of recession and increased prosperity worldwide. In recent years, China has supplied almost one-third of the growth in the global economy (measured by purchasing power), compared with the 13 percent that came from the U.S.

Moreover, the U.S. has a history of offering Asia economic advice that proves awful. U.S. pressure helped produce Japan's disastrous bubble economy and aggravated the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis....

... managing relations with China ... one of (Bush's) very few successes in foreign policy - but lately he has engaged in protectionism. ... reimposed quotas on certain Chinese textiles, and the Treasury warned China that it had better adjust its exchange rate or else.

... Sure, China's cheap yuan has cost us manufacturing jobs - but it has also led to a flood of Chinese capital to A merica, keeping interest rates low....

unfair ... accusing China of not stopping North Korea.... the North Koreans don't listen to the Chinese about anything ... China ... it at least has a coherent policy on North Korea. That's more than you can say for the Bush administration.

One of the biggest risks ... a military strike on the North Korea ... radiation had reached the Chinese coast would provoke anti-American fury across China.

... China's schools teach hatred ... slogans such as "Japanese must die."

... Japanese ships may start exploring disputed waters for oil and gas ... China's leaders will then be under tremendous popular pressure to send China's own military vessels ... And then Japan will ask the U.S. for help under the U.S.-Japan security treaty. ... In the past, President Jiang Zemin protected the U.S.-Chinese relationship ... Hu Jintao, seems much less likely to go out on a limb to preserve good relations with the U.S.

...Poisonous trade disputes with China will only aggravate the risks ahead, strengthen the hard- liners in Beijing and leave ordinary Chinese feeling that Americans are turning into China-bashers. Sadly, they'll have a point. '

...China is expanding its navy but is a long way from becoming a major maritime power on a scale that could challenge or supplant the United States.... China might seek to form an exclusive strategic relationship with one or more Middle Eastern oil states. But even were Beijing to proffer such an arrangement, what putative partner would accept it? Finally, China could team up with other extra-regional powers to counter American predominance in the Middle East — but with which powers and by what means? Clearly, Beijing seems to favor for now flexible partnerships and issue-specific tactical alignments.

... The greater danger is that China might trade certain weapons or technologies (e.g., anti-ship cruise missiles or radar defense systems) for access to energy.

... For China there are risks associated with pursuing its interests in the Middle East. Beijing must tread carefully lest it be drawn into regional rivalries or a clash with the U.S. '

The six-party talks ... have stalled. Pyongyang has gained effective control and pacing of the crisis... The world is powerless to assess the accuracy of its escalating assertions ... Each day (North Koreans) advance their nuclear options, enhancing their military capability and increasing the price they can demand at the negotiating table.

... not wait for Pyongyang to decide whether and when it is ready to negotiate ...

... to permit North Korea ... invites others to follow suit...

To fall back to missile defenses .. is inadequate.

... The U.S. vision should be painted with bold, clear strokes -- including security assurances, economic cooperation, and diplomatic recognition -- in exchange for North Korea's complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons program.

take that vision to our partners ..., to incorporate their elements ... forge a consensus

... Pyongyang would then be given a specific deadline to respond.

... Critically, a North Korean rejection of this offer would leave all of the other four parties siding with the U.S. That solidarity would be essential to establishing the political basis for a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Pyongyang.

... Today (Kim Jong Il) may well view nuclear weapons as an invaluable asset to perpetuate his regime; our job is to turn them into a liability.

... Disputes over the format for negotiation should ... not raised to the level of principle. And this approach is not a policy of regime change. To the contrary, it proposes actions to undermine North Korea's stability as a last resort, rather than as a first choice. A policy of regime change could not gain South Korean and Chinese support. Without that, it would be irresponsible to rely on Kim Jong Il's demise as the solution ...

In dismissing North Korea's nuclear posturing, some have asked, "What are they going to do with their nuclear weapons, anyway?" The world cannot afford to wait for an empirical answer to that question. '

Today, the political landscape is entirely different. Besides Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and most recently Indonesia and East Timor have become genuine democracies. Throughout the region, democratic transformation has been underpinned by strong economic growth, ironically driven today by Chinese capitalism. One would have been foolhardy to predict such a future for Asia back in 1967.

This democratic revolution was helped along by a critical shift in American policy that occurred during the Reagan years ... from a "realist" policy of support for friendly dictators towards encouragement of democratic transition. ... Wolfowitz ... together with his boss George Shultz, played a key role .... take the risks of a plunge into democracy.

... democracy promotion ... is not a new initiative, but one that has been given real content over the past two decades. ... "no" referendum against General Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1988...

Democracy in Asia has been a messy business. Four newly elected presidents in new democracies there ... faced impeachment proceedings shortly after being elected. (Two) were actually removed from office ... All four faced crises of legitimacy, either because they were elected by a minority of the voters, had no support in the legislature and faced disastrously low popularity ratings, or were charged with fraud or corruption...

Democratic politics in Asia, just as in the U.S., has been disappointingly personality- and scandal-driven ... while Joseph Estrada was no Vaclav Havel, the manner in which Philippino elites used extralegal street demonstrations to remove him also raises questions about how well electoral politics is institutionalized there.

Many people in Asia have contrasted the uneven performance of Asian democracy to the technocratic efficiency of authoritarian states like Singapore and Malaysia. But ... these recent problems represent the growing pains of new democracies and not a permanent feature of democracy itself. ... Finally, constitutional courts played critical roles in resolving executive-legislative deadlocks in the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan; in earlier years, these sorts of disputes would have been solved by military intervention. Democratic institutions, in other words, worked as they were supposed to.

Democratic politics can often make the United States uncomfortable, which is why Washington has at times preferred predictable authoritarians. Both South Korea and Taiwan have moved dramatically to the left over the past decade; their foreign policies are scarcely recognizable compared to what they were during the Cold War. South Korea has sought rapprochement with the Communist North, making impossible a hard-line U.S. policy to turn back Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons, while Taiwan has threatened cross-Straits stability by making noises about independence from mainland China. The process of political change has been accelerated in these countries by winner-take-all presidential systems that contrast with the slower-moving parliamentary one in Japan. But there is no question that these reorientations in the policies of the two countries represent genuine democratic choices on the part of their populations, reflecting generational change in the Korean case, and the rise of indigenous Taiwanese in Taiwan's.

... Indonesia ... most vividly demonstrates the fallacy of much of the contemporary conventional wisdom about democracy. Observers ... that, first, "Asian values" did not support democracy; that Islam was similarly an insuperable obstacle; and that paternalistic authoritarians like Suharto presented a good model for development. Contemporary Indonesia contradicts all three points. It is unquestionably Asian and Muslim, and yet has evolved into a credible democracy ...

Indonesia shows, in fact, that even for an Asian Muslim society, democracy is the only durable source of legitimacy. The Indonesian people supported Suharto's soft authoritarianism only as long as it delivered the goods of rapid development, but when it hit a setback during the Asian crisis, that legitimacy crumbled. There was no reservoir of good will for dictators that are incompetent as well as corrupt. ... Indonesia still faces enormous problems: Corruption has moved from a wholesale to a retail level; poverty has increased ... threat of jihadism....

In the democratic transformation of Asia ... the U.S. often played a critical role when it ceased to hold back, and indeed encouraged, local demands for accountable government. The East Asia of 2005 that resulted is incomparably more hospitable to U.S. interests ... It is something to keep in mind as we contemplate the trade-off between familiar dictators and uncertain democracies in other parts of the world. '

... necessary, if not urgent, for Washington to work more actively towards rapprochement and better co-operation between ... China, Japan and the US.

The US ... conduct the lion's share of diplomacy at the bilateral level in Asia.

... little strategic interaction there is. Japan and China are especially furtive about exposing themselves in any high-stakes diplomacy involving the US and the other power...

... call for a high-level meeting between Washington, Tokyo and Beijing.

Critics of the trilateral idea warn that the US should be mindful about creating a regional architecture that alienates other neighbours ... and must avoid giving China a forum that could enhance its regional prestige.

... The US has a clear interest in Japan being reconciled more honestly with its past, not as a favour to China but in recognition that antipathy toward Tokyo runs deep in Asia.

... While America has been focusing on regions such as Afghanistan and Iraq, China has been busy establishing itself as the next great power on the world scene.

Beijing does not need US help to enhance its regional stature; it is doing this on its own. The question, therefore, is not whether China will be a great power, but how the US will help influence the direction that China takes in its new role. A US-Sino-Japan strategic summit could go a long way toward promoting a co-operative, constructive China, rather than a challenging one.

The (three) have many mutual interests, including: a growing need for secure energy supplies; a common front in the war on terror; a goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula; a desire to solve territorial disputes peacefully; an interest in seeing Asian economic growth and prosperity continue; and an overriding need to reassure the other states of Asia that the enormous Asia-Pacific region is big enough for Japan, China and the US to coexist and prosper.

Helping to define and shape the rules of the road for the Pacific century is a noble and important effort and one in which the US should take the lead. '

... suggestions that contrary to American fears and misgivings, the deal would not only consolidate Sino-Israeli ties but also further American intelligence capabilities vis-à-vis China.

...The U.S.-led sanctions following the Tiananmen controversy merely enhanced Israel's role as the proverbial "backdoor" to Western technology.

Likewise, Israel found China to be a prime customer, especially in the 1980s, when its lucrative arms markets in Latin America and South Africa were either drying up or becoming politically untenable.

... the U.S. was also an indirect player in the military saga. While demanding its European allies to continue military sanctions against China, it was indifferent toward the Sino-Israeli arms trade.

The end of the Cold War, however, altered erstwhile American indifference toward Sino-Israeli ties. It no longer needed Beijing as a counterweight to Moscow, and Washington began to perceive Sino-Israeli relations, especially the military deals, as a threat to its interests in the Pacific region.

... Israel is not the only country that faces growing American demands on strategic issues.

... In early 1992, Israel was accused of the unauthorized transfer of American technology to China; ... technological details on the Patriot anti-missile system

... charges that Israel had retransferred U.S. technology from the Lavi fighter program to China.

... the Phalcon controversy when Israel agreed to install the advanced early warning systems aboard a Russian platform. At one time ... Barak was even warned that annual American aid would be cut to express American anger and displeasure over his refusal to heed.

... Israel canceled the deal, apologized to Beijing and agreed to pay huge financial compensation ... In response, the U.S. agreed to Israel's decision to sell the Phalcon to India. For its part, Israel agreed to exercise caution and exhibit transparency in its military dealings with China.

... Yet, Israel could not avoid using the time-tested military means to regain the trust and confidence of China. ... Over the years, the military dimension has become the indicator to measure Israel's relations with the outside world. ... military sales play a pivotal role in the close ties that Israel maintains with Turkey and India.

Europe is facing the American music over the possible renewal of military sales to China, India over its bourgeoning energy ties with Iran, and China over its relations with North Korea.

Israel, unfortunately, is more vulnerable than most. Therefore, so long as it depends upon Washington for political support, economic largess and strategic backing, Israel's ability to pursue an independent arms export policy toward China will continue to be limited and circumspect. '

... Putin's bizarre and brutal crackdown on Yukos ... creating a state-run oil giant ... the noises Mr. Putin has made suggesting that he might give a stake in the new oil monopoly to China.

... China's soaring consumption of oil, and its impact on world oil prices.... the increasingly aggressive forays overseas by its state-controlled energy companies in places as far-flung as Sudan, Ecuador and Saudi Arabia....

...Could this emerging alliance of erstwhile enemies disrupt the stability of oil markets, or lead to sharply higher prices? Might this eventually lead to a realignment of geopolitics that threatens the West's essential energy supplies?

... oil is a fungible global commodity traded on vibrant futures markets. Therefore, the actual ownership of oil assets matters little these days. After all, even the most anti-Western regime must still sell its oil on the world market if it is to feed its people ... ... it is a folly for China (and India, for that matter) to waste billions on equity oil in pursuit of "energy security": a genuine oil shock will send the price of every barrel of oil shooting past $100, regardless of such investments.

... neither Russia nor China is as big a force on the world oil scene as scaremongers will have you believe. A look at where the world's proven oil reserves lie reveals that Russia holds less than a fifth of the world's total, while Saudi Arabia sits atop a whopping quarter share. It is true that Russia's oil production today, about 10 million barrels per day, is on par with that of the Saudis, but that is a bit like a poor man splurging on his credit card. Given its paltry reserves, Russia simply cannot challenge the Saudis over the long term for control of the world oil market.

... concern in the West if a resurgent Russia began to act like a member of (OPEC). If Russia curbed its output in cahoots with the cartel in order to squeeze prices, then consumers would surely suffer. But ... Russia's self-interest lies in ... not cutting output, but pumping freely and therefore "free-riding" on OPEC's discipline. Besides, the Chinese would surely not support Russian efforts to raise prices ....

... (Chinese) oil demand shot up 16% last year, and was clearly a force propping up oil prices. ... Last year's oil boom is simply not sustainable. Much oil went to one-off stockpiling or as a temporary fix to power shortages.... Russia will not displace Saudi Arabia on supply, Chinese demand will not surpass America's for decades.

... the most important energy relationship to watch is ... the one between Saudi Arabia and America. ... as non-OPEC sources of oil dwindle in coming years, every official forecaster expects Saudi output to soar sharply. ... increased risk of terrorist attack, embargo and economic shock. These age-old troubles, not any sinister new Axis of Oil, are the real reason to worry about oil ... '

... India's political elite debates how far it should enter the US embrace. But India is being wooed and its pride at this is palpable.

... Bush and Rice earlier this year "developed the outline for a decisively broader strategic relationship" between the US and India.

... its purpose being "to help India become a major world power in the 21st century", the abiding dream of the Indian elite.

... "We [the US] understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement."

... The US is offering India a top-of-the-line version of the F-16, hi-tech defence and space co-operation in terms of satellites and launch vehicles, Patriot and Arrow missiles, and access to civilian nuclear technology. (India's aim is to generate 25 per cent to 30 per cent of its huge energy needs from nuclear.)

"The strategic dialogue will include global issues, the kinds of issues you would discuss with a world power," ... The US was prepared to "discuss even more fundamental issues of defence transformation with India, including transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defence." '

... US ambassador to India David Mulford said the US and India "are poised for a partnership that will be crucial in shaping the international order in the 21st century".

... The core judgment is that a strong, democratic and influential India is an asset for the US in the region and the world. The US no longer narrowly defines India within the terms of its rivalry with Pakistan and Bush accepts the reality of India as a nuclear power.

Bush's thinking is shaped by India's democratic values in contrast with China's authoritarianism. Its strategic essence is the US view that India as a second Asian giant, capitalist, multicultural and democratic, will exert a gravitational pull that must limit China's aspiration as a future hegemon and help to balance its rise. This is a new long-run US position (and it .doesn't assume that India can overtake China.).

It should test how far India's elite has transcended the Nehruian diplomatic legacy. It seems, however, that Singh will accept the US overtures and India will negotiate to get the best deals possible. By saying yes to the US, India is hardly selling its soul. It is not being asked to become an ally similar to Japan or Australia since that would be impossible anyway.

India thinks it can manage this US embrace on its own terms. It knows that China and the world will have to take India more seriously and India will have to give China assurances it is not joining any US "containment of China" strategy....

Singh, an economic technocrat, has declared that India's new role in the world will be defined by how it manages globalisation. That is a long advance from Nehru. And it dictates a diplomacy to underwrite entrepreneurship, markets and technology, with all that implies for a more positive view of the US.

'...how determined (Chinese) officials are not to pick a fight with the United States while they focus single-mindedly on economic growth. In fact, many of them get nervous talking about China's rise to power. "It frightens me," said Wu Jianmin, a senior diplomat. "We are still a poor country, a developing country. I don't want people to think of us in... exaggerated terms." ... "Please remember, our per capita GDP is $1,200. America's is 25 to 30 times that. We have a long way to go."

... Chinese businessmen ... sound a good bit bolder. They speak of the world's biggest market, the largest consumer base, the strongest growth trajectory.

... That is the strange effect of China's size. It can be both a Third World country and a dominant global player at the same time. As a result, there is tension in China between a society bursting at the seams and a state trying to manage this process.

... interesting debate over the concept of "peaceful rise."

... Many Western analysts believed the problem was the first word in the phrase—"peaceful"—which could limit China's options on Taiwan. But that doesn't seem to be the case. China regards Taiwan as a domestic matter and believes it could use force as a last resort. "Lincoln fought a war to preserve the Union," Zheng told me, "but you can still say that the United States was rising peacefully."

... China's growth—its rise—is creating energy, ambition and, inevitably, fear among its neighbors. In addition, in the past year Beijing has made several crude assertions of power... Singapore's senior statesman (and longtime friend of China's), Lee Kuan Yew, longtime friend of China's), Lee Kuan Yew worried about the next generation. "China's youth must be made aware of the need to reassure the world that China's rise will not turn out to be a disruptive force," he said ...

... "It is vital that the younger generation of Chinese who have only lived through a period of peace and growth and have no experience of China's tumultuous past are made aware of the mistakes China made as a result of hubris and excesses in ideology," Lee said.

... To face the future confidently, China must be able to face its past truthfully. '

... Who could have imagined that China would emerge as our second largest trade partner?

...Countries that imposed sanctions on India when we declared ourselves a nuclear weapons power are building bridges with us, to take advantage of the opportunities for mutual economic benefit.'

(Neocons) "conned" China into believing that their national goal should be to overtake the United States of America as the world's leading economic and military "superpower".

All of China’s economic successes are associated with liberalization and globalization...

Never in world history have so many workers improved their standards of living so rapidly. Thus popular support for globalization is greater than in Japan, where postwar recovery occurred in a highly managed economy, or with the former Soviet Union, where shock therapy traumatized society. In consequence, China has effectively become an ally of U.S. and Southeast Asian promotion of freer trade and investment than is acceptable to Japan, India and Brazil.

... China’s globalization successes are profoundly influencing its neighbors. India has learned from China the advantages of a more open economy. Asians schooled in antipathy to foreign investment and Latin Americans with protectionist traditions are going to have to be more open to foreign investment and less dependent on loans in order to compete with China. This will transform third world strategies of development and create broader global opportunities for our companies.

Contrary to early fears, China’s rise has stimulated neighbors’ trade and foreign investment rather than depriving them. Indeed China’s recent growth spurt revived Japan’s economy and saved key neighbors from recession, possibly averting a dangerous global downturn.

Chinese growth has brought American companies new markets. The flow of profits from China to the U.S. is as disproportionate as the flow of goods. Inexpensive products have substantially improved the living standards of poorer Americans. Inexpensive Chinese goods and Chinese financing of our deficit have kept U.S. inflation and interest rates down and prolonged our economic booms. At the same time, it has caused trade deficits and social adjustments. Chinese misappropriation of intellectual property creates losses for many of our companies. A manic construction and transportation boom has raised global raw materials prices, to the great benefit of producers and a great cost to consumers.

China’s success is one of the most important developments of modern history, but projecting from current growth to Chinese global dominance or threats to our way of life is just wrong. Unlike the old Soviet Union, reformist China does not seek to alter any other country’s way of life. Its economy faces world history’s most severe combination of banking, urbanization and employment challenges, and by 2020 a demographic squeeze that will have few workers supporting many dependents. The best outcome for us would be a China that is eventually like Japan, prosperous, winning in some sectors, losing in others. Signs that China is making rapid progress in that direction should be welcomed, not feared.

... Herman Kahn, who wrote a book called “The Emerging Japanese Superstate.” Japanese experts constantly worried that, if their economy really succeeded, we would intervene to put them down. Herman Kahn invariably replied, “You don’t understand Americans. We won’t attack you. We’ll take credit for everything you achieve.”

Not so long ago, Japan was the height of fashion. Then came the post-bubble recession and it rapidly faded into the background, condemned as yesterday's story. The same happened to the Asian tigers: until 1997 they were the flavour of the month, but with the Asian financial crisis they sank into relative obscurity. No doubt the same fate will befall China in due course, though perhaps a little less dramatically because of its sheer size and import. '

... the fickleness of western attitudes towards the region's transformation. A combination of curiosity and a fear of the unknown fuel a swelling interest, and then, when it appears that it was a false alarm, old attitudes of western-centric hubris reassert themselves: the Asian tigers were victims of a crony culture and Japan was simply too Japanese.

... The age-old western habit of believing that its arrangements - of the neo-liberal variety, in this instance - are always best proved as strong as ever: it is in our genes.

... Japan largely ignored the advice and has emerged from its long, post-bubble recession looking remarkably like it did before the crisis.

... Japan has long been part of the advanced world. It was the only non-western country to begin its industrialisation in the 19th century, following the Meiji Restoration in 1867. It has the second largest economy and enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world. By any standards, it is a fully paid-up member of the exclusive club of advanced nations. Yet Japan is quite unlike any western society. In terms of the hardware of modernity - cars, computers, technology, motorways and the rest - Japan is, unsurprisingly, largely familiar. However, in terms of social relations - the way in which society works, the values that imbue it - it is profoundly different.

... the differences: the absence of antisocial behaviour, the courtesy displayed by the Japanese towards each other, the extraordinary efficiency and orderliness that characterise the stuff of everyday life, from public transport to shopping.

... the differences between Japan and the west? ... their different ethos. Individualism animates the west, now more than ever. In contrast, the organising principle of Japanese society is a sense of group identity, a feeling of being part of a much wider community. Compared with western societies, Japan is a dense lattice-work of responsibilities and obligations within the family, the workplace, the school and the community. ... the Japanese sense of self is quite distinct from the western notion of individualism. As a result, people behave in very different ways and have very different expectations, and their behaviour is informed by very different values.

... Japan ... is still blighted by a rigid and traditional sexual division of labour.

... Japan has universal suffrage, but the idea of alternating parties in government is almost entirely alien. Real power is exercised by factions within the ruling Liberal Democrats rather than by the other political parties, which, as a consequence, are largely marginal. We should not be surprised: in a society based on group culture rather than individualism, "democracy" is bound to be a very different kind of animal.

... Far from conforming to the western model then, Japan remains profoundly different. And so it has always been. After the Meiji Restoration it deliberately sought to engineer a modernisation that was distinctively Japanese, drawing from its own traditions as well as borrowing from the west. Globalisation notwithstanding, this is still strikingly the case. Indeed, Japan remains unusually and determinedly impervious to many of the pressures of globalisation. The lesson here, perhaps, is that we should expect the same to be true, in some degree or another, of the Asian tigers - and ultimately China too. That is not to say they will end up looking anything like Japan: China and Japan, for example, are in many respects chalk and cheese. But they will certainly be very different from the west because, like Japan, they come from very different histories and cultures.

It will form new alliances, some of which may be in conflict with the West.

... This is evident in China's increasing search for energy resources in Central Asia, a political zone already congested with a growing post-9/11 American presence, with a Russian and Indian re-engagement and with Saudi Arabian and Pakistani regional linkages.

China will need to convince the international community that its "peaceful rise" is not limited only to areas where its own vital strategic interests are not threatened. In the 19th century, Europeans went to war over raw materials. Times have changed, but the tides may not have.

Then there is the question of the trajectory of China's rise. What does China really want? Do we know? Does China know? Every great civilization brings an idea to the world. What idea would China bring?

The West believes it has a historic destiny. But it is not certain what China aspires to be and what it would choose to portray to the world. China's new alliances with India and Europe, and its distancing from certain other regions, clearly demonstrate a wish not only to exist in the world, but to be at the helm of world affairs.

... It is not just a single country that is rising; a progressive regional integration will result in the rise of a continent. And we must remember that this is the continent that contains the greatest portion of mankind.

... Europeans, who hold little potential for conflict with China, have a particularly significant role to play in establishing this dialogue. ...

But to hold a dialogue, we need to know each other. The people - and above all students, entrepreneurs, cultural figures, academics and politicians - must meet and come to know each other. China would then cease to seem exotic; it would become familiar.

... the constitution would make the EU a more effective partner for the US. It would help make EU foreign policy somewhat more coherent - and outward-looking - by streamlining EU institutions and replacing the rotating EU presidency with a standing president and foreign minister. The document would also give the EU the power to deal more effectively with homeland security issues such as asylum policy and immigration. Notwithstanding some neoconservative fantasies in the US, in no way would the constitution undermine the Nato alliance or oblige US allies such as Britain and Poland to follow France and Germany on issues like Iraq.

... (the result of a French No).... With French politics thrown into disarray and Mr Chirac discredited, big initiatives would be put on hold until the next French presidential election in 2007. ... Membership negotiations with Turkey, scheduled to begin next October, would most likely be put off thereby encouraging a nasty, anti-western backlash in Turkey, which rightly feels it has met the EU's criteria. '

The division between the rapid economic rise of China's east and the slow growth of the west has left the country divided. The environmental destruction caused by the centrally planned economy, and that the market economy has ignored or made worse, may cap China's economy before it reaches its full maturation. The social havoc that centrally planned birth control and an aging society may produce in the near future could force huge changes in the government's role in private life, or worse it could create a backlash against the government. Generational and ideological unrest could boil over as new technologies link disparate groups together.

Perhaps the gravest threat is the rapid growth of the eastern coast, generated by cheap loans from poorly managed state banks, which could potentially undermine the booming economy. Any one of these liabilities could slow China's growth; all of them could sink China's rise. '

... If the U.S. wants to succeed, it will have to decide what its primary goal on North Korea is: policy change or regime change.

... There are still those in (Chinese) government who think in Third World revolutionary ways: more bombs for poor nations means the rich ones will be less powerful. But even these officials have come to recognize that a nuclear North Korea would create tensions in East Asia that would sour the peace and stability they so prize.

From Beijing's point of view, the collapse of North Korea would be a nightmare. It would mean refugees, a failed state on its border, demands for aid and that perennial Chinese fear, instability. It would also mean that after Korean unification, American troops would be on China's border. So Beijing is not going to assist in any policy that threatens the North Korean regime.... '

Robert Kagan in Washington Post - 'There has been much discussion recently about how to "manage the rise of China." The phrase itself is soothing, implying gradualism, predictability and time. Time enough to think and prepare, to take measurements of China's trajectory and adjust as necessary. If China eventually emerges as a clear threat, there will be time to react. But meanwhile there is time enough not to overreact, to be watchful but patient and not to create self-fulfilling prophecies. If we prematurely treat China as an enemy, it is said, it will become an enemy.

The idea that we can manage China's rise is comforting because it gives us a sense of control and mastery, and of paternalistic superiority. With proper piloting and steady nerves on our part, the massive Chinese ship can be brought safely into harbor and put at anchor. It can be "integrated" into the international system and thereby tamed and made safe for civilized existence in the postmodern world. Wisely "managed," China can be a friend. Badly managed, it can become a very dangerous power indeed. But at least the choice seems to be ours.

The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power. The most successful "management" of a rising power in the modern era was Britain's appeasement of the United States in the late 19th century, when the British effectively ceded the entire Western Hemisphere (except Canada) to the expansive Americans. The fact that both powers shared a common liberal, democratic ideology, and thus roughly consonant ideas of international order, greatly lessened the risk of accommodation from the British point of view.

Other examples are less encouraging. Germany's rise after 1870, and Europe's reaction to it, eventually produced World War I. Even the masterly Bismarck, after a decade of successful German self-management, had a difficult time steering Europe away from collision. The British tried containment, appeasement and even offers of alliance, but never fully comprehended Kaiser Wilhelm's need to challenge the British supremacy he both admired and envied. Right up until the eve of war, highly regarded observers of the European scene believed commercial ties among the leading powers made war between them unlikely, if not impossible.

Japan's rise after 1868 produced two rounds of warfare -- first with China and Russia at the turn of the century, and later with the United States and Britain in World War II. The initial Anglo-American response to Japan's growing power was actually quite accommodating. Meiji Japan had chosen the path of modernization and even Westernization, or so it seemed, and Americans welcomed its ascendancy over backward China and despotic Russia. Then, too, there was the paternalistic hope of assisting Japan's entry into the international system, which was to say the Western system. "The Japs have played our game," Theodore Roosevelt believed, and only occasionally did he wonder whether "the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as white devils inferior to themselves . . . and to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our national jealousies, and beat us in turn."

... But there is no reason to believe we are any smarter today than the policymakers who "mismanaged" the rise of Germany and Japan. The majority of today's policymakers and thinkers hold much the same general view of global affairs as their forebears: namely, that commercial ties between China and the other powers, especially with Japan and the United States, and also with Taiwan, will act as a buffer against aggressive impulses and ultimately ease China's "integration" into the international system without war. Once again we see an Asian power modernizing and believe this should be a force for peace. And we add to this the conviction, also common throughout history, that if we do nothing to provoke China, then it will be peaceful, without realizing that it may be the existing international system that the Chinese find provocative.

... But isn't it possible that China does not want to be integrated into a political and security system that it had no part in shaping and that conforms neither to its ambitions nor to its own autocratic and hierarchical principles of rule? Might not China, like all rising powers of the past, including the United States, want to reshape the international system to suit its own purposes, commensurate with its new power, and to make the world safe for its autocracy? Yes, the Chinese want the prosperity that comes from integration in the global economy, but might they believe, as the Japanese did a century ago, that the purpose of getting rich is not to join the international system but to change it?

... we need to understand that the nature of China's rise will be determined largely by the Chinese and not by us. The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy, for instance, and there is nothing we can do to change that. Partly this is due to our actions -- such as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, which began during the Clinton administration, and our recent efforts to enhance strategic ties with India. Partly it is due to our different forms of government, since autocratic rulers naturally feel threatened by a democratic superpower and its democratic allies around their periphery. Partly it is due to the nature of the situation in East Asia. It used to be an article of faith among Sinologists that the Chinese did not want to drive the United States out of the region. Today many are not so sure. It would not be unusual if an increasingly powerful China wanted to become the dominant power in its own region, and dominant not just economically but in all other respects, as well.

When one contemplates how to "manage" that, however, comforting notions of gradualness, predictability and time begin to fade. The obvious choices would seem to lie between ceding American predominance in the region and taking steps to contain China's understandable ambitions. Not many Americans favor the former course, and for sound political, moral and strategic reasons. But let's not kid ourselves. It will be hard to pursue the latter course without treating China as at least a prospective enemy, and not just 20 years from now, but now. Nor, if that is the choice, can Chinese leaders be expected to wait patiently while the web of containment is strengthened around them. More likely, they will periodically want to challenge both the United States and its allies in the region to back off. Crises could come sooner than expected, and without much warning, requiring difficult judgments about the risks and rewards of both action and inaction.

That is likely what the future holds. The United States may not be able to avoid a policy of containing China; we are, in fact, already doing so. This is a sufficiently unsettling prospect, however, that we are doing all we can to avoid thinking about it. We conjure hopeful images of a modernizing China that seeks only economic growth and would do nothing to threaten commercial ties with us -- unless provoked -- even as we watch nervously the small but steady Chinese military buildup, the periodic eruptions of popular nationalism, the signs of Chinese confidence intermingled with feelings of historical injustice and the desire to right old wrongs.

Which China is it? A 21st-century power that wants to be integrated into a liberal international order, which would mean both a transformation of its own polity and a limitation of its strategic ambitions? Or a 19th-century power that wants to preserve its rule at home and expand its reach abroad? It is a worthy subject for debate, because the answer will determine the future as much as or more than anything we do. But it is unlikely we will have a definitive answer in time to adjust, to "manage" China's "rise," any more than our predecessors did. As in the past, we will have to peer into the fog and make prudent judgments, informed by the many tragic lessons of history. '