Russia / Caucasus / C. Asia

... Russian society’s response to its wrenching modernization could degenerate into a nationalist revolution led by xenophobes.

... 50% of Russians support the slogan “Russia for Russians.” ... nationalism has spread from the streets into the elite.

Today’s hardcore Russian nationalists consider Putin’s regime too soft, too pragmatic, too reasonable – in their language, “weak and indecisive.” They loathe it for its “surrender” in Ukraine to the “Orange Revolution,” and they condemn the decision to give land along Siberia’s Amur River to China.

The “Putin Center” can be displaced. Recall that Russia’s pro-Western liberals, ascendant a decade ago, have been relegated to the ideological fringe, with the very word “democrat” (let alone “pro-West”) now a term of abuse.

... Fortunately, there is no sign yet (not even on the horizon) of a charismatic leader capable of forging the scattered energies of national-socialist grievances into a critical mass of hatred and “national revival.”

... no one even mentions the idea of introducing a dictatorship, abolishing elections ... ... Russia’s “democrats” are abused, (but) the word “democracy” remains a sacred cow.

Instead, a populist-nationalist revolution might resemble the attempt to overthrow ... Gorbachev in August 1991, or a Russian version of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. It might be some sort of “democratic nationalist revolution” – spontaneous, and not made by any one political party but by a popular mass movement. It would be anti-bureaucrat, anti-oligarch, anti-West, and staunchly pro-nationalist.

... (Putin) fully aware of the danger posed by populist nationalists.

... But .... to defeat the far right, Putin’s regime will be forced to take its stand on more or less liberal ideological grounds. This won’t be easy for a regime based on the twin pillars of bureaucracy and the security apparatus.

... liberals should ... support Putin’s regime insofar as it maintains the foundation and institutions of a liberal order...

Yet an alliance with the nationalists against Putin currently tempts many Russian liberals.

...both absurd and dangerous. ... “Weimar” ... the pact with the devil that German conservatives and royalists made by backing Hitler. ' Charles Tully in RFE/RL -- '... with respect to at least two countries, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, Washington must maintain a careful balance between its economic and strategic interests on the one hand, and their peoples' desire for democracy on the other. '

... It is not clear how the Bush administration might be helping democracy movements in Uzbekistan, but efforts to provide aid via nongovernmental organizations are under way in Azerbaijan.

... Marina Ottaway (Carnegie Endowmwnt)... told RFE/RL that Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan appear to be facing what she calls "second transitions." The first was their independence when the Soviet Union broke up; the second, she said, is deposing the communist-era leaders who remained in power afterward.

... According to Ottaway, the U.S. government is divided on how and even whether to help postcommunist countries on the road to democracy. On one side, there is what she called the "old-school" thinking of leaving well enough alone. On the other, she said, there is an effort to learn from those "second transitions."

"... a lot of thinking within the State Department on what we are learning about these democratic transitions in postcommunist states," Ottaway said..."'What have we learned from the second transition (Serbia, Ukraine...) that could be applied to other countries?'"

Which thinking will prevail? Ottaway said she suspects the State Department will concentrate its efforts in countries where the effort will reap benefits.

Ottaway said it is too early to say whether nongovernmental organizations in Azerbaijan will receive support from the United States. ... the pro-democracy movement is fractured. She said the different opposition factions could help their cause if they begin working together more closely.

...developments that make the United States more reluctant to support opposition movements in postcommunist countries. One is the danger that such efforts could destabilize their political environment. ... uncertainty in Kyrgyzstan and to what she calls the political "mess" in Serbia.

... The other ... that governments with growing democracy movements are cracking down on NGOs that promote civil society.

... "It's really developing a more comprehensive diplomatic approach that enables [the U.S. government] to speak both to the governments in these countries where we have interests, but also making a consistent and firm effort to speak to the governments about their need to adhere to democratic principles and practice, and to the people of these countries in order to let them know that we stand behind their own democratic aspirations," (Christopher Walker, a Eurasia analyst at Freedom House) said.

... it is much easier to make a revolution than it is to transform a failed state into a well-performing democracy.

... First, the window of opportunity for democratic reform is very narrow and will not stay open indefinitely.

... Second, reform has to be comprehensive. One cannot reform parts of the state structure and retain the old order in others.

... Third, the people are the best ally of the reformers....

... Fourth, reformers must build free institutions that will endure long beyond their term in office.

... Finally, reformers should not count on keeping society permanently happy. They should accept that, sooner or later, their constituents will be disappointed with them and they will be voted out of office. '

... (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) demonstrated how the world's biggest oil companies are turning to increasingly expensive and complex projects to gain access to new reserves.

... (BTC) will gradually ramp up to carrying about 400,000 barrels of oil a day ... in the first few years of operation. The line's maximum capacity of one million barrels ... slightly more than 1% of global demand -- isn't enough of a gusher to tame today's superhigh oil prices. Still, the project ... a welcome new cushion for world markets.

"Our supply situation is so much worse than expected," said Amy Myers Jaffe, a fellow at the James A. Baker III Institute at Rice University in Houston. "So this increment is so important."

The pipeline is expected to be feeding tankers by the fourth quarter. The crude it will carry is of the light, weet variety markets value most. By the end of the decade, the field's output is expected to increase to the pipeline's maximum capacity. In the meantime, Kazakhstan has said it will ship some of its oil production in coming years across the Caspian to Baku and then through the line.

BP and the pipeline's planners -- including the administrations of Presidents Bush and Clinton -- have weathered years of skepticism about the project's economic and geopolitical hurdles, from declining forecasts of Caspian production to fears of terrorism and political unrest.

The Caspian Sea region's oil discoveries have fallen short of heady forecasts of the 1990s ... Caspian production amounts to about two million barrels of oil a day, about the same amount Iraq's insurgency-wracked industry is delivering now. High-end estimates of reserves in the region are just 33 billion barrels, compared with about 715 billion barrels in the Persian Gulf.

... one more alternative to the often-volatile Middle East and other oil-rich but politically shaky hot spots .... project as a way of fostering stability and cementing political and economic ties with regional governments ...

BP ... the world's second-largest publicly traded oil company by market capitalization, after Exxon Mobil Corp. ... declining output at some of its older fields and slowing growth at its big joint venture in Russia...

"...a new hydrocarbon province." BP is planning to build a natural-gas pipeline along the same right-of-way, making both projects more cost efficient, though ... each of the pipelines are "commercially robust" as stand-alone projects.

Much of the world's easy-to-tap oil reserves already are being developed or are closed off to foreign companies. As international companies increasingly compete with state-owned companies or smaller players willing to accept lower returns, BP and other large companies have used their ability to put together massive projects as their strongest competitive advantage.

Massive projects like BTC that are "geographically complex, geologically complex and geopolitically complex" will be much more the norm for Big Oil than big, easy-to-find oil fields, said Brenda Shaffer...

... pipeline is specifically designed to thwart terrorist attacks ... is completely buried ... skirts the ecologically delicate Borjomi Gorge ...

Each government has invested heavily in security and emergency-response arrangements, including paying local tribesmen to guard facilities along some stretches. The U.S. military is also training and equipping local security forces in the region. But terrorism worries still weigh.

"... a very robust project," said Gal Luft ... Still, "when a pipeline is buried, it's more difficult to hit it, but it's also more difficult to fix if it does get hit."

... the new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.... would loosen Russia's and Iran's grip on the transport of Caspian and Central Asian oil by creating a new route that is friendlier to the United States and Europe.

For Turkey, which has few energy supplies of its own, the pipeline is the initial step in its effort to become a major energy player, not as a producer but as a transit point. In an era when countries are increasingly looking to diversify their energy sources, Turkey hopes to establish itself as a kind of energy supermarket, betting that controlling oil routes will turn out to be as strategically valuable as producing the stuff.

... But growing political dissent across the Caucasus and central Asia - encouraged by President Bush in his visit to Georgia this month - is complicating matters

... Turkish planners envision a country crisscrossed by pipelines, carrying oil, gas, and natural gas. Turkish officials say they plan to spend some $80 billion over the next two decades to develop the country's energy infrastructure.

... The BTC is initially expected to carry close to 1 million barrels of oil per day... By most measures, it's a drop in the oil bucket - Saudi Arabia alone pumps 7 million barrels per day - but ... in today's energy markets, even a small amount can have a big impact on prices.

(Brenda Schaffer) "On a world level, every development of oil that's outside of OPEC changes the dynamic of the market in a number of ways. The more sources that are outside of OPEC, the less it can control world oil prices."

... "The money that has arrived in the region is allowing for economic growth in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and is helping with stability. The security relationships [between the three BTC countries] have become more crystallized because of the cooperation."

... security and environmental concerns. The pipeline is built underground to deter terrorist attacks and minimize the possibility of rupture, but it still snakes through areas prone to earthquakes and political unrest.

... (Bulent Aliriza) ... that a much larger pipeline runs from Iraq to Turkey, but it gave Ankara little influence over Saddam Hussein during the time he was in power. "There are limits to the political leverage that a pipeline gives."

... What may ultimately make the difference in Turkey's long-range energy plan are the changing needs of the European Union (EU), which it hopes to join. An EU paper on energy policy issued in 2000 designated Turkey as an "energy corridor" that should be developed.

"It was originally a US strategic thing, to get around Iran and Russia," says Gareth Winrow ... "Now there is the EU wanting to diversify its resources and build new pipelines.

"These things are coming together - US interests, EU interests, and Turkish interests, and it's something Turkish officials know they can play on." '

The last half of this year promises to be eventful in Baku. ... the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is expected to become operational in late 2005, around the same time parliamentary elections are held in November. Already, there are indications that the election could prove tumultuous. Political uncertainty, in turn, could cloud the pipeline’s prospects for a smooth launch.

Opposition parties have become increasingly active in 2005, clearly emboldened by the revolutionary trend in the former Soviet Union that has produced regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan over the past 18 months.

... some opposition demonstrators could be seen holding portraits of US President George W. Bush.

... the Bush administration in an especially awkward position. As a key backer of the BTC project, Washington has developed a close strategic relationship with ... Aliyev... US ... promoted stabilization initiatives in recent months, including a diplomatic push to break the stalemate in the talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. A stable political environment is needed to help BTC realize its economic potential, many observers say.

... given the Bush White House’s messianic advocacy of democratic values, US officials cannot appear to discourage the Azerbaijani opposition’s quest for a free-and-fair vote.

Opposition leaders ... gave every indication that the use of confrontational tactics would continue. "Although hundreds of people were arrested and injured, these people brought the victory of democracy even closer," said Isa Gambar, leader of the opposition Musavat Party (said)

A spokesman for the governing Yeni Azerbaijan party, Husein Pashayev ... hinted ominously that international organizations played a role in organizing the opposition rally. However, he declined to identify any foreign entity under suspicion of assisting anti-Aliyev forces.

... The US and EU commitment to democratic reforms is sure to be put to the test in Azerbaijan in the coming months.

... Some political analysts in Baku believe the government is committed to retaining power at any cost... '

... Instead, his government is under a cloud of international condemnation for its violent handling of an opposition demonstration

The Azerbaijani authorities have been undermined by their own authoritarian reflex and their complete failure to anticipate international reaction...

... If the government is worried about the forthcoming elections, it has cause to be. A new wind of change is blowing through the region.

... the state authorities have the examples of Georgia and Ukraine to remind themselves of the dangers of cheating the electorate in parliamentary elections.

... a pipeline that will soon be bringing billions of dollars into the state budget. Most governments would be confident of contesting an election with the promise of so much new money flowing into the country. But state corruption and the opacity of government institutions have undermined popular trust. Oil revenues have been pouring into the state coffers for years but few in Azerbaijan have seen the benefits. '

... Bush administration officials said Syria's stance has prompted intense debate at high levels in the administration about new steps that might be taken against the Syrian government. The officials said the options included possible military, diplomatic or economic action. But senior Pentagon and military officials cautioned Monday that if any military action was eventually ordered, it was likely to be limited to insurgent movements along the border.'

Poverty, corruption, repressive security agents, price controls on cotton sales, steep taxes on small businesses and restrictions on small traders have created a disgruntlement that has nothing to do with religion. Karimov's cronies have monopolized industries for their own advantage.

Karimov ... has extended his term by referendum rather than face any opposition.

... instead of restoring public confidence by offering concrete economic reforms (Kerimov) continues to blame his problems on Islamic terrorists and the foreigners who support them. (Uzbekistan) won't have one of those "color" revolutions... Despite international expectations ... power there will never be transferred the way it was in Georgia's Rose Revolution, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, or even Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution, where crowds were unruly and the outcome uncertain. Popular frustration may be even greater in Uzbekistan than it was in any of these countries. But their revolutions coalesced around opposition figures who had administrative experience and widespread support, and who were able to use flawed electoral processes to unseat entrenched leaders. In contrast, Uzbek public figures who criticize their regime are few and far between.

... The pro-democracy groups exist entirely in exile. Uzbekistan's new parliament, which has very limited powers, was chosen by a process that left virtually no room for participation by critics of the regime.

... There are pro-reform elements within Uzbekistan's ruling elite -- in economic ministries, parliament, the private sector, the diplomatic service, even the military -- but to name these people would put their jobs at risk. There is no evidence that they are organized and many may not know of each others' existence.

Uzbekistan's powerful ministers -- of internal affairs, state security and defense -- help keep a distance between Karimov and the closet reformers who serve him. In theory, these ministers could be strong enough to oust the president, a la Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania. But cooperation has never been their strong suit.

Even if they were to make common cause, there is little reason to expect that their president-designate would be any more pro-reform than his predecessor. True reform would cost them the economic benefits and perquisites of power that they would be seeking to preserve. It is far more likely that they might embrace religion in the hope that an empowered Islamic establishment would prevent Islamic militants from persecuting their secular benefactors.

The use of force to put down popular protest may buy a regime a little more time if disturbances are small and uncoordinated. Cutting off telephones or the Internet simply delays the spread of news, but does not stop it. Each time unarmed civilians are killed, a measure of public support for the regime dies, whether or not the press is allowed to report on it. Inevitably there will come a day when force does not prevail.

In Uzbekistan that would be a prelude to turmoil. Regional figures, bolstered by support from local clerics, would likely vie for the right to form a new national government, using remnants of competing state security forces to advance their cause. Unlike in Iraq, or Afghanistan, no international force would be prepared to step in to fill the vacuum. Even Russia would be reluctant to offer help because of how this would be seen by its own Muslim population and by the international community .

Political disarray in Uzbekistan could rapidly destabilize the border regions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and undermine the security of their governments. It will end any prospect for democratic reform in Kazakhstan, which would almost certainly impose martial rule in its politically unreliable south.

... United States in an awkward position. Supporting the end of the Karimov government would undermine a U.S. military ally without being sure that something better would follow. The best hope for long-term peace and prosperity in the region is for the international community to press the Karimov regime to change.

An important first step would be for the Uzbek government to accept an international investigation into what happened in Andijon. Back-channel diplomacy to get Karimov's acquiescence to this should include promises of international assistance to help the country cover its budget deficits while shrinking the role of the state in the economy. In return, Uzbek authorities would have to permit registration of foreign nongovernmental organizations and promise to step up the pace of civic institution building.

... If the Uzbek regime can't or won't fix its problems, then the world community will soon face the choice between intervention and chaos. '

... The Bulgarian and Romanian relative positions in front of Moscow remain, by the way, very different, as Sofia is more Russia-friendly for historical and cultural (i.e. religious) reasons.

... Historically, the main security concern for all Eastern, Central-Eastern and South-Eastern European countries has been not to fall prey to German or Russian hegemony. An offshore great power (Great Britain or the U.S.) is therefore preferable to a continental one.

... in the last few years, Bruce Jackson ... has worked ... to open the way for a "Pax Americana" extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Caspian region.

... the Black Sea is already vital for European energy acquisition, and that it will be even more so in the future. E.U. countries import around 50 percent of their energy, and they are projected to import 70 percent of it in 2020. The Black Sea will be the vital link to transport the Caspian resources to the West.

Washington is therefore trying to increase its political influence in the region, hence controlling present and future European capabilities.

The geopolitics of the Black Sea is still searching for stability ...

The political future of the European Union and the German-American relationship will be the key variables in how this develops. An increased, federalist European integration coupled by a strong Euro-American relationship would probably result in a diminution of great powers' competition and in a stronger Western hold on the area, at the expense of Russian ambitions. On the contrary, a more independent German foreign policy, predicated upon strategic partnerships with Russia and China rather than upon a "Euro-Atlantic community," could revamp a serious intra-Western competition... '

Is there a domino effect? Is the U.S. succeeding in bringing changes to regimes that stood unshaken since independence in 1991, where present leaders were in power even during the Soviet period? In Kyrgyzstan, the answer is clear. In Uzbekistan, the process will take more time, and has proved to be much more violent. But unless President Karimov dramatically reviews economic priorities and the need to allow more freedom, he might have to contemplate the idea of exile in Moscow. '